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MARYLAND IS DYING FOR A SLAYER STATUTE: THE
INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMON LAW SLAYER RULE IN
MARYlAND
If, urged by greed profane,
He grasps at ill-got gain,
And lays an impious hand on holiest things.
Who when such deeds are done
Can hope heaven's bolts to shun?l
- Greek chorus s response to Oedipus's
confession to killing his father
I.

INTRODUCTION

In October 1931, Walter J. Martin shot and killed his wife, Della A.
Martin, then committed suicide immediately after the shooting. 2 Ordinarily, Della Martin's estate would pass to Walter as her surviving
spouse under Maryland's intestacy statute,3 however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled in Price v. Hitaffer that Della's estate could not
be distributed to Walter or through his estate due to Walter's criminal
act. 4 In this case of first impression, the court reasoned that Maryland's intestacy statute should be read according to common law maxims of equity, and adhered to the literal meaning of the statute as not
to unjustly enrich Walter and his heirs. 5
Over seventy years after Price, the Court of Appeals of Maryland was
confronted with a similar issue of first impression in Cook v. Grierson. 6
Mter Charles Grierson pled guilty to the second degree murder of his
father, Frederick Charles Grierson, Jr., Frederick's widow brought an
action to disinherit Charles from Frederick's estate. 7
By 2004, when Cook reached the Court of Appeals, the Court had
developed a body of case law on which to base its decision. The Court
of Appeals's interpretation of the common law slayer rule, however,
has produced differing and at times conflicting decisions concerning
the distribution of a victim's assets. 8 Forty-two states have adopted
1. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING 81 (F. Storr trans., Harvard University Press,
1912).
2. Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933).
3. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 127 (1933) (current version at MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS § 3-102 (LexisNexis 2004».
4. Price, 164 Md. at 508, 165 A. at 471.
5. Price, 164 Md. at 514-16,165 A. at 473-74.
6. 380 Md. 502, 505, 845 A.2d 1231, 1232 (2004).
7. Cook, 380 Md. at 504,845 A.2d at 1232.
8. See infra Parts III-IV.
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slayer statutes that mirror common law, but Maryland has yet to enact
such a statute. 9 This comment examines various decisions rendered
by the Court of Appeals, and evaluates whether the court's decisions
have been consistent in the absence of a slayer statute. 10
Part II traces the development of the slayer rule in the United States
from common law to codification in forty-two states. Part III explores
the development of the slayer rule in Maryland, beginning with Price
v. Hitaffer, and discusses the inconsistencies in the Court of Appeals's
decisions since Price. Part IV examines Cook v. Grierson and explains
why Maryland needs a slayer statute. Part V discusses why enacting a
slayer statute is more beneficial than continuing to interpret the common law. Lastly, Part VI highlights why Maryland's statutory scheme is
inadequate to deal with slayer issues and proposes a slayer statute for
Maryland.
9. See, e.g., AlA. CODE § 43-8-253 (1991) (treating the slayer as having predeceased the victim); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803 (1975) (predeceased);
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 250,252,258 (West 2002) (predeceased); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15-11-803 (West 2005) (treating slayer as having disclaimed his
or her share); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-447 (West 2004) (predeceased); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2322 (2001) (predeceased); D.C. CODE
§ 19-320 (2001) (predeceased); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West 2005)
(predeceased); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-5 (1997) (predeceased); HAw. REv.
STAT. § 560:2-803 (2004) (disclaimed); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803 (2001)
(predeceased); 755 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/2-6 (West 1992) (predeceased); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12.1 (LexisNexis 2000) (predeceased);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.535 (West 2003) (predeceased); RAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-513 (2004) (treating slayer as having died simultaneously); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (West 1994) (treating slayer as having forfeited his
share); LA. CN. CODE ANN. art. 946 (Supp. 2005) (predeceased); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. IS-A, § 2-803 (1998) (predeceased); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN.
§ 700.2803 (West 2002) (disclaimed); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-803 (West
2002) (predeceased); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-25 (West 1999) (predeceased); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813 (2005) (disclaimed); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 30-2354 (1995) (predeceased); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:7-1.1 to 7-7 (West
Supp. 2005) (predeceased); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-803 (LexisNexis 1995)
(disclaimed); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -11 (2003) (predeceased); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (1996) (disclaimed); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2105.19 (West 2005) (predeceased); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (West
Supp. 2005) (all benefits are distributed to other heirs of the decedent);
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 112.465-.545 (2003) (predeceased); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8801-8815 (West 1975) (predeceased); R.1. GEN. LAws §§ 33-1.1-1
to -16 (1995) (predeceased); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-803 (Supp. 2004) (predeceased); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 29A-2-803 (1997) (disclaimed); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-106 (2001) (forfeiture); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803
(Supp.2005) (disclaimed); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551(6) (2002) (forfeiture and estate passed to other heirs of decedent); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55401 to -414 (2003) (predeceased); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 11.84.010-.900
(West 1998) (predeceased); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (LexisNexis 2004)
(predeceased); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 852.01, 854.14 (West 2002) (disclaimed); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101 (2005) (all benefits are distributed to
other heirs of the decedent). See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803
(amended 1997),8 U.L.A. 459 (2005) (predeceased).
10. See infra Parts III-IV.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE SLAYER RULE IN THE UNITED
STATES

Although the slayer rule in the United States has its origin in English common law, American legislatures and courts have dictated its
development since the eighteenth centuryY The abolishment of attainder, forfeiture of estate, and corruption of blood forced the courts
to find alternative means to preclude a slayer from taking from his
victim's estate. 12 Gradually, legislatures promulgated slayer statutes
and judges began the task of interpreting these statutes.
A.

Common Law

At common law, the doctrines of attainder/ 3 forfeiture of estate,14
and corruption of blood 15 allowed courts to readily adhere to the
principle nullus commondum capere potest de injuria sua propria, or "[n] 0
man can take advantage of his own wrong."16 Under the common
law, once a person was sentenced to death or pronounced to be an
outlaw, he or she was attained, and ~art of the felon's punishment was
forfeiture of any land or chattels. I Thus, a slayer could not profit
from his victim's death because, upon conviction, the slayer was
forced to forfeit anything he or she may have inherited from the victim. I8 Furthermore, the corruption of blood doctrine ensured that
the slayer's heirs could not inherit from the slayer's victim, as the sins
of the slayer were visited on his descendents. I9 Once a slayer's conviction triggered forfeiture, "there was no longer any title in the wrong11. See infra Part II.A-B.2.
12. See infra Part II.A-B.
13. Attainder is "the act of extinguishing a person's civil rights when that person is sentenced to death or declared an outlaw for committing a felony or
treason." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 137 (8th ed. 2004).
14. Forfeiture of estate in the context of this comment is the loss of property
because of a crime. Id. at 677.
15. Corruption of blood occurs "when anyone is attainted of felony or treason,
then his blood is said to be corrupt; by means whereof neither his children,
nor any of his blood, can be heirs to him, or to any other ancestor, for that
they ought to claim by him." Id. at 371 (quoting LES TERMES DE LA LEY
[CERTAIN DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS AND TERMS OF THE COMMON AND
STATUTE LAws OF ENGLAND, NOW IN USE, EXPOUNDED AND EXPLAINED] 125
(photo. reprint 1993) (1. Johnson 1812».
16. Julie J. Olenn, Comment, 'Til Death Do Us Part': New York's Slayer Rule and In
ReEstates of Covert, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 1341 (2001); see Callie Kramer, Notes
and Comments, Guilty lJy Association: Inadequacies in the Uniform Probate Code
Slayer Statute, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 697, 699 (2003).
17. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 137; Olenn, supra note 16, at 1343 n.9.
18. Cf Olenn, supra note 16, at 1343 (implying that "forfeiture of all lands and
chattels" must include all land and chattels that would have been inherited
from the victim).
19. Alison Reppy, The Slayer'S Bounty-History of Problem in Anglo-American Law,
19 N.Y.V. L. REv. 229, 233 (1942).

274

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 35

doer to pass to his heir."20 Therefore, the combination of attainder,
forfeiture of estate, and corruption of blood denied not only the
slayer from benefiting from the distribution of his victim's estate, but
also his heirs.21
B.

The Slayer Rule Reaches the Courts

Once federal and state constitutions abolished the aforementioned
common law doctrines, courts began interpreting the slayer rule in a
different light. 22 The doctrines of attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of blood no longer excluded the slayer from inheriting. Rather,
the common law maxim that no man shall profit from his own wrongdoing prevailed. 23 In the absence of a slayer statute, courts infused
state statutes of descent and distribution with this maxim. 24
1.

Abolishment of Common Law Doctrines

When the doctrines of forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood
were abolished by our federal constitution 25 and state constitutions or
statutes,26 slayer-beneficiaries used these prohibitions to challenge the
constitutionality of the slayer rule. 27 Most courts employed the owned
interest rationale to uphold the slayer rule, asserting that the constitutional ban on forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood laws only
pertained to property the slayer owned and not property the slayer
had in interest. 28 Thus, the slayer was not being forced to forfeit
20. [d. Note that the forfeiture was retroactive to the date the crime was committed. [d. (quoting 3 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 69 (Methuen & Co. 1966)).
2l. See Kramer, supra note 16.
22. See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted.") .
26. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 17 ("No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed; and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate."); MD. CONST.
DECL. OF RIGHTS., art. 27 (LexisNexis 2003) ("[N]o conviction shall work
corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate."); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAw § 79-b
(Consol. 1992) ("A conviction of a person for any crime, does not work a
forfei~u~~ of any property, real or personal, or any right or interest
therem. ).
27. Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L.
REv. 489, 538-39 (1986); see, e.g., Weaver v. Hollis, 22 So. 2d 525, 526-27
(Ala. 1945); Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 506-07, 165 A. 470, 470 (1933);
Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 1908); Box v. Lanier, 79 S.W.
1042, 1047 (Tenn. 1903).
28. Fellows, supra note 27, at 540 (citing Weaver, 22 So. 2d at 529 (holding that
precluding the slayer from taking "does not inflict upon him any greater or
other punishment for his crime than the law specifies, and takes no property from him, but simply bars him from acquiring property by his
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property he owned, because any inheritance from his victim should be
classified as a mere expectancy interest. 29
The American legal system abolished the forfeiture of estate and
corruption of blood doctrines well before the English Parliament did
so by statute in 1870. 30 The issue of the slayer's right to inherit in the
absence of these doctrines, however, reached American and English
courts at roughly the same time. 31
2.

u.S. Supreme Court Interprets the Slayer Rule

New York Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Armstront2 is the first United
States Supreme Court case concerning the interest of a murderer in
his victim's estate. 33 There, the Mutual Life Insurance Company of
New York issued an insurance policy to Armstrong, payable to
Hunter. 34 Six weeks after the policy was issued, Armstrong was attacked on the street and died two days later. 35 Hunter was subsequendy convicted and sentenced to death for murdering Armstrong,
and the insurance company refused to pay the proceeds of the policy
to Hunter's estate. 36 The Supreme Court ruled that the slayer's estate
could not collect from the life insurance policy, stating:

29.
30.

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

crime")); Box, 79 S.W. at 1047 (explaining that "title to the policy never
vested in the surviving husband, and, therefore, there was nothing for him
to forfeit").
See Fellows, supra note 27, at 540.
Reppy, supra note 19, at 235. The Forfeiture Act of 1870 formally abolished
forfeiture for treason and felonies, but this doctrine was first restricted in
1814 by Statute 54 Geo. 3 (Eng.) which stated:
That no attainder for felony which shall take place after the
passing of this Act, save and except in cases of the crime of High
Treason, or of the crimes of Petit treason or Murder ... shall extend to the disinheriting of any Heir, nor to the Prejudice of the
right or title of any person or persons ....
Id. at 234-35. Interestingly, one year after this statute was enacted, Amicable
Society v. Bolland established a rule of public policy dictating "neither the
insured nor those claiming through or under him could recover for the
loss produced solely by his criminal act, death by the hands of the law being
so produced." Id. at 237. See Amicable Soc'y v. Bolland (Fauntleroy's Case)
(1830), 4 Bligh (N.S.) 194, 211, 5 Eng. Rep. 70,76 (Ch.).
Jeffrey Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CrN. L. REv. 803,
844-45 (1993). The slayer-beneficiary issue was first reached by the English
court in Cleaver v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, (1891) 1 Q.B. 147 (Q.B.D.)
(Eng.) (ruling that a wife who murdered her husband was unable to collect
the benefits of his life insurance policy even though she was designated as
beneficiary). Id. at 845 n.201. Conversely, the first American case allowed a
wife convicted as an accessory before the fact to her husband's murder to
take her dower interest. Id. (citing Owen v. Owen, 6 S.E. 794 (N.C. 1888)).
117 u.S. 591 (1886).
Id.
Id. at 592-93.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 592-94.
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[I] ndependently of any proof of the motives of Hunter in
obtaining the policy, and even assuming that they were just
and proper, he forfeited all rights under it when, to secure
its immediate payment, he murdered the assured. It would
be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country, if one
could recover insurance money payable on the death of a
party whose life he had feloniously taken. As well might he
recover insurance money upon a building that he had willfully fired. 37

Although corruption of blood had been abolished by the United
States Constitution, the Supreme Court appears to have resurrected
this common law doctrine by precluding Hunter's estate, and his potentially innocent heirs, from collecting the insurance proceeds. The
Court's decision recognizes that" 'the social interest served by refusing to permit the criminal to profit by his crime is greater than that
served by the preservation and enforcement of legal rights of ownership.' "38 Thus, the Court's decision reflects the equitable justification
on which the slayer rule rests. 39

3.

Riggs v. Palmer

Three years after the Supreme Court's decision in New York Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, the Court of Appeals of New York extended the basis for the slayer rule in Riggs v. Palmer40 by encompassing moral principles to deny slayers a share in their victims' estates. 41
This New York decision became the perennial case for the slayer rule,
particularly for non-insurance cases. 42 In Riggs, Elmer poisoned his
grandfather to prevent him from revoking provisions of his will that
were in Elmer's favor. 43 Generally, testators may distribute their property as they see fit with few legislative restraints. 44 The Court of Appeals of New York, however, opined that "it never could have been
[lawmakers'] intention that a donee who murdered the testator to
37. Id. at 600.
38. John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory
Solution, 49 HARV. L. REv. 715, 715-16 (1936) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 43 (Yale Univ. Press 1921».
39. See Olenn, supra note 16, at 1349-50.
40. 22 N.£. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
41. See generally Olenn, supra note 16, at 1349-50.
42. Gregory C. Blackwell, Comment, Property: Creating a Slayer Statute
Oklahomans Can Live With, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 143, 147 (2004).
43. Riggs, 22 N.£. at 189.
44. Id. (stating that property distribution statutes are designed "to enable testators to dispose of their estates . . . and to carry into effect their final
wishes"); cf Barron v. Janney, 225 Md. 228, 234-35, 170 A.2d 176, 180
(1961) (stating that most decisions throughout the United States agree that
"the purpose of the statutes of descent and distribution is to make such a
will for an intestate as he would have been most likely to make for
himself').

2005]

Ineffectiveness of the Common Law Slayer Rule

277

make the will operative should have any benefit under it."45 Indeed, a
strict construction of the statute would give a victim's property to his
murderer, allowing a slayer to profit from his crime. 46 Thus, the court
of appeals employed "rational interpretation"47 to New York's statute
regulating wills and the transfer of property, and disqualified Elmer
from taking under his grandfather's will.48
The majority refused to endorse the concept that lawmakers intended to allow slayers to inherit from their victims. 49 Rather, the
court held that fundamental maxims of common law, such as no one
shall be permitted to profit from his own fraud, take advantage of his
own wrong, found any claim upon his own iniquity, or acquire property by his own crime, could "control the effect and nullify the language of wills."50 According to the court, lawmakers were aware of
these fundamental maxims and other civil law when they drafted the
pertinent statutes and did not deem it necessary to physically incorporate them into every statute. 51 It is immoral for an undeserving slayer
to take advantage of laws that would normally direct inheritance to
him.52 It, therefore, would be an absurd consequence to allow a slayer
to take under the will if he willfully murdered his victim for the express purpose of expediting his inheritance. 53
The dissent adamantly supported a strict adherence to the Statute
of Wills and the black letter law of the legislature. 54 The dissent further criticized the majority's "system of remedial justice," which altered the disposition of the legislature by integrating the court's
notions of equity and morality into its decision. 55 The dissent noted
that the Statute of Wills includes specific ways a will may be altered or
45. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189.

46. Id.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 189, 191.
49. Id. at 190. Judge Earl questioned,

What could be more unreasonable than to suppose that it was the
legislative intention in the general laws passed for the orderly,
peaceable and just devolution of property, that they should have
operation in favor of one who murdered his ancestor that he might
speedily come into the possession of his estate?
Id.
50. /d.

51. Id. Judge Earl referred to canons of the Napoleonic Code and Roman Civil
Law that dictate "one cannot take property by inheritance or will from an
ancestor or benefactor whom he has murdered." Id.
52. Olenn, supra note 16, at 1349.
53. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189-90. Specifically, Judge Earl quoted William Blackstone: "[I]f there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences,
manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those
collateral consequences void." [d. at 189 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *91 (St. George Tucker ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1969».
54. [d. at 191 (Gray, j., dissenting).
55. [d. at 191-92. Judge Gray explained, "[T]he matter does not lie within the
domain of conscience. We are bound by the rigid rules of law, which have
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revoked, and significantly, conviction of a criminal act is not a means
through which a will can be altered or revoked. 56 The dissent admonished the majority's judicial lawmaking and objected to its virtual rewriting of the testator's will. 57
The dissent's rationale for advocating only a plain meaning of the
statute in a slayer case was not completely nove1. 58 Just one year
before the New York decision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed a lower court's ruling that precluded a claimant, Mrs. Owens,
who was serving a life sentence for being an accessory before the fact
to the murder of her husband, from taking her dower rights. 59 Under
the North Carolina statute, the only way a woman could forfeit her
dower was by committing adultery, "however heinous [any other criminal activity] may be."60 The chief justice questioned: "[D]oes anyone,
as a consequence of an unlawful taking of human life, become
thereby disabled to take a part of the estate left by the deceased, which
the law gives him, and gives him subject to no such condition?"61 The
court concluded by reasoning that promulgating grounds to deny
dower is the duty of the legislature. 62
The Riggs majority expressly disagreed with the holding in Owens, 63
contending that Mrs. Owens assumed the risk of losing the dower
when she willfully and intentionally killed her husband to make her-

56.

57.
58.
59.

60.

61.
62.

63.

been established by the legislature, and within the limits of which the determination of this question is confined." Id. at 191.
See id. at 192 (referring to the statute that states that unless by method specifically mentioned, no will, nor any part of a will, can be revoked or altered). The facts of Riggs v. Palmer did not meet any of the cases
mentioned; thus, "the will of the testator is unalterable." Id.
Id. at 192-93.
See Daniel A. Farber, Courts, Statutes, and Public Policy: The Case of the Murderous Heir, 53 SMU L. REv. 31,31 (2000).
Owens v. Owens, 6 S.E. 794, 794-95 (N.C. 1888). At common law, a dower
right is a "wife's right, upon her husband's death, to a life estate in onethird of the land that he owned in fee." BLACK'S LAw DIGrIONARY 507 (8th
ed.2004).
Owens, 6 S.E. at 794. The exact wording of the statute that bars recovery of
a dower is, "if any married woman shall commit adultery, and shall not be
living with her husband at his death, she shall thereby lose all right to
dower." N.C. CODE § 2lO2 (1883) (repealed 1959).
Owens, 6 S.E. at 795.
Id. The North Carolina legislature took the advice of Chief Justice Smith
and amended the dower statute to deny a wife recovery of her dower interest if she murdered her husband. Reppy, supra note 19, at 248.
Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889). Even though Owens was the
first American case addressing the emerging slayer rule, the precedent set
by Owens v. Owens was merely persuasive authority for the Riggs court. Farber, supra note 58, at 33-34. The Riggs court also could have distinguished
Owens by noting that a dower is not controlled by a husband; a husband
cannot dispose of this asset and the intent of the testator that the Riggs
majority emphasized, was immaterial in Owens. Id. at 34.
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self a widow. 64 It was this artful integration of common law maxims
and modern statutes that produced the result in Riggs,65 which has
defined the slayer rule for over a century.66
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SLAYER RULE IN MARYLAND

Maryland's slayer rule emerged in Price v. Hitajfer,67 where a husband killed his wife and immediately thereafter took his own life. 68
This 1933 case set precedent in Maryland for slayer cases over the next
seventy odd years. During that period, the Maryland General Assembly has not enacted a formal slayer statute, leaving the courts to undertake the arduous task of formulating a slayer rule. Although the case
law since Price has extensively developed the slayer rule in Maryland,
inconsistencies still remain. 69
A.

Price v. Hitaffer: The Emergence of the Slayer Rule in Maryland

In Price v. Hitajfer, Maryland's first slayer case, the personal representative of the slayer's estate petitioned the Orphans' Court of Baltimore City, seeking distribution of the estate of his wife and victim.70
The orphans' court ordered that the slayer's heirs be excluded from
the distribution of the victim's estate. 71 The heirs appealed to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland as a case of first impression. 72 By the
time this case reached the Court of Appeals, nearly forty years of precedent regarding the slayer rule had been developed in other courts
in the United States. 73
In reaching its decision, the Price court explored two differing perspectives that had been adopted by other courts. 74 The first line of
reasoning interpreted provisions of a will and statutes of descent and
64. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 191 (explaining the maxim volenti non fit injuria, "to a
willing person it is not a wrong," should have guided the Supreme Court of
North Carolina to deny Mrs. Owens the benefits of a widowhood that she
feloniously created); cf 57B AM. JUR. 20 Negligence § 767 (2004) (providing
the definition of volenti non fit injuria).
65. Farber, supra note 58, at 37.
66. Id. at 36.
67. 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933).
68. Id. at 506, 165 A. at 470.
69. See infra Part V.B.
70. Price, 164 Md. at 506, 165 A. at 470.
7l. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.; see, e.g., Slocum v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 816 (Mass. 1923);
Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641 (Mo. 1908); Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188
(N.Y. 1889); Johnston v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 100 S.E. 865 (W. Va. 1919).
74. 164 Md. at 506, 165 A. at 470 (explaining that the court is at liberty to
follow either approach, both of which have been either investigated or argued by counsel); see also Stephen B. Gerald, Comment, judg;ments of Prior
Conviction as Substantive Proof in Subsequent Civil Proceedings: A Study of Admissibility and Maryland's Need for Such a Hearsay Exception, 29 U. BALT. L. REv.
57, 62 (1999).
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distribution in light of "universally recognized principles of justice
and morality" as founded on the public policy that encompasses the
common law maxims of equity.75 The majority did not confine this
rationale to probate law, but rather asserted this method of interpretation for all laws, statutes, and contracts more generally.76 The second
line of reasoning adhered to by the court relied on the strict interpretation of statutes. 77 Under this rationale, common law maxims were
abrogated when the legislature enacted a statutory scheme. 78 The
public policy represented by the statutes of descent and distribution as
well as will execution and effect supplanted the public policy of the
common law maxims. 79
In a decision similar to Riggs v. Palmer, the Price court ultimately
chose to infuse the Maryland statutes of descent and distribution with
common law maxims, thereby excluding the slayer's personal representative from taking from his victim's estate. 80 The Court of Appeals
first determined that both the Maryland Declaration of Rights and
Federal Bill of Rights included the common law. 8) Then, the court
referred to other case precedent and legal scholars to establish the
importance of the common law in our scheme of statutory laws. 82
Quoting Henry Campbell Black, the court stated, "No statute enters a
field which was before entirely unoccupied. . . . Whether the statute
affirms the rule of common law upon the same subject, or whether it
supplements it, supersedes it, or displaces it, the legislative enactment
must be construed with reference to the common law."83 This quotation emphatically reflects the philosophy of the Price court and essentially justifies its construction of Maryland's descent and distribution
statutes.
Before selecting a method of interpretation, the court addressed
the argument that the order of the orphans' court violated the consti75. Price, 164 Md. at 506, 165 A. at 470; see also supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
76. Price, 164 Md. at 506, 165 A. at 470.
77. Id. at 506-07, 165 A. at 470.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 515-16, 165 A. at 474.
81. Id. at 510, 165 A. at 472. Judge Digges stated:
It is impossible to conceive that the maxims of the common law
now under consideration, and which we are asked to apply, are inconsistent with or repugnant to the spirit and principles of republican institutions whose strength lies in the virtue and integrity of the
citizen to correct the morals and protect the reputation, rights, and
property of individuals, by denying the right of a murderer to enrich himself by taking any part of his victim's estate.
Id.
82. See id. at 511-16, 165 A. at 472-74.
83. Id. at 515,165 A. at 473-74 (quoting HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON
THE CONSTRUGrION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAws, 360) (West Publishing) (2d ed. 1911) (alteration in original».
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tutional and statutory provisions prohibiting corruption of blood and
forfeiture of estate. 84 The court reasoned there could be no forfeiture
because the slayer did not have beneficial use or possession of the
estate of his victim before the murderous act. 85 Under the common
law doctrine, a criminal forfeited any property held at the time of the
commission of the crime and not any property he held in interest. 86
Therefore, the slayer did not actually forfeit any property he possessed
at the time he killed his wife. 87 Interestingly, the court raised the issue
of whether the order of the orphans' court violated corruption of
blood, but it did not elaborate further on this topic. 88 The court's
holding, which excluded heirs from participating in the victim's estate, did not apply if the descendents also were descendents of the
victim. 89 Further, it appears the court allowed the slayer's criminal act
to corrupt the slayer and his bloodline. 90
B.

Maryland Case Law Since

Since the Price decision in 1933, Maryland courts have defined and
interpreted the common law slayer rule without the aid of a statute
from the legislature. 91 Through a series of cases involving various fact
patterns, the courts have relied upon Price to create an effective slayer
rule in Maryland. 92
1.

Chase v. jenifer

In Chase v. jenifer,93 for example, a wife stabbed and killed her husband, the latter of whom had a history of abusiveness when he had
been drinking.94 The wife was the named beneficiary on the husband's life insurance policy, but the insurer petitioned to have the
84. Id. at 508, 165 A. at 471.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also Reppy, supra note 19, at 232-33. Under the English common law
doctrine of attainder, the land, tenements, goods and chattels of "the attainted [convicted] felon" were surrendered to the King upon pronouncement of conviction. Id. Thus, a felon could only forfeit what he or she had
at the time of conviction and nothing obtained thereafter. See Price, 164 Md.
at 508, 165 A. at 471.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 507-08, 165 A. at 471. It may be inferred that the court chose not to
further elaborate on the corruption of blood doctrine because it had established that Mr. Martin had never inherited Mrs. Martin's estate. Therefore,
the court was not visiting the sins of Mr. Martin on his heirs since Mr. Martin never had any of Mrs. Martin's estate to pass to them in the first place.
See id. at 505, 508, 165 A. at 470-71.
89. See id. at 505, 508, 165 A. at 470-71.
90. Id. at 505, 518, 165 A. at 470, 474.
91. See infra Part III.B.I-4.
92. [d.
93. 219 Md. 564, 566, 150 A.2d 251, 252 (1959).
94. Id. at 566, 150 A.2d 252.
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wife disqualified. 95 Although the wife argued that she was trying to
protect herself, the fact-finding lower court ruled that she used "excessive means" in defending herself. 96 While the wife conceded that the
killing was unlawful and felonious, she argued that it was also unintentional and should not prevent her from collecting from the insurer. 97
The Court of Appeals of Maryland decisively pronounced that
"[w]here the killing is both felonious and intentional, we think the
beneficiary cannot prevail. ... "98 Further, the court found that because the wife committed voluntary manslaughter, she had the specific intent to kill her husband. Thus, the wife could not collect under
her husband's life insurance policy.99 The court, however, did not
address the consequences of an unintentional murder. lOO
2.

Schifanelli v. Wallace

The issue of whether a beneficiary who unintentionally killed his
victim could inherit from that victim was answered in the affirmative
in Schifanelli v. Wallace. lOI In this case, Frank Wallace alleged that he
accidentally shot his wife, Marie Wallace, when he was showing her his
gun. I02 The killing was ruled as unintentional and the trial court concluded that Mr. Wallace could receive the proceeds from Mrs. Wallace's life insurance policy.lo3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court, relying on the intent of the slayer as a basis for determining
whether a slayer was entitled to proceeds. 104 Because the issue was not
fully resolved in Chase v. Jenifer,105 the court first referred to the case
law of other jurisdictions, a majority of which allowed a similarly situated slayer to collect. 106 Next, the court cited the public policy be95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

[d. at 565, 150 A.2d 252.
[d. at 566, 150 A.2d at 252-53.
[d. at 569, 150 A.2d at 254.
[d. at 570, 150 A.2d at 255.
[d. at 569-70, 150 A.2d at 254-55.
[d.; see also Stephen]. Karina, Ford v. Ford: A Maryland Slayer's Statute is Long
Overdue, 46 MD. L. REv. 501, 504 (1987).

101. 271 Md. 177, 189, 315 A.2d 513, 520 (1974).
102. [d. at 181, 315 A.2d at 515.
103. [d. at 182, 315 A.2d at 516.
104. [d. at 188-89, 315 A.2d at 519 (citing Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident
Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1966); Jackson v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 254 A.2d 141, 147 (NJ. 1969»; see also Karina, supra note 100,
at 504.
105. 219 Md. 564, 569, 150 A.2d 251, 254 (1959).
106. Schifanelli, 271 Md. at 188, 315 A.2d at 519 (citing Tippens v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 1938) (holding that a slayer rule cannot
be applied to circumstances where the record does not decisively indicate
whether the deceased died from natural causes, an accidental fall, or a
quarrel that ended with an unintentional blow to the deceased); Throop v.
W. Indem. Co., 193 P. 263, 323-35 (Cal. 1920) (finding that grossly negligent discharge of the gun led to the unintentional killing of the deceased
and the slayer could inherit); Schreiner v. High Court of Ill. Catholic Order
of Foresters, 35 Ill. App. 576, 580 (1890) (holding that insurance contracts
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hind the slayer rule. 107 The purpose of the slayer rule is to prevent
one who intentionally killed his victim from inheriting. Thus, the
slayer rule should not be applied when the killing is neither intentional nor careless. lOS A synthesis of Chase and Schifanelli produces a
coherent precedent concerning the requisite intention of slayers. 109
A slayer must act intentionally or feloniously to be barred from taking
as a beneficiary under the victim's life insurance policy or will.110
3.

The Price, Chase, Schifanelli Trifecta Examined in Ford v. Ford

Twelve years later, the rulings of Price, Chase, and Schifanelli were
examined by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Ford v. Ford. 1 11 This
case involved a slayer who was insane at the time of the crime. 1 12 Specifically, Pearl Ford was found not criminally responsible, due to insanity, for the murder of her mother. 113 This case is extremely
important to the development of the common law slayer rule in Maryland because the Court of Appeals lays out the slayer rule in statutory
format after evaluating Maryland case precedent. l14 Generally, under
the court's quasi-statute, the slayer should be precluded from sharing

107.
108.
109.
1l0.
llI.
112.
113.
114.

"assume[ ) the risk of all carelessness[,)" and a killing that is the result of
carelessness should not preclude the killer from taking under the contract); Stacker v. Mack, 130 N.E.2d 484, 487-88 (Ind. 1955) (allowing the
slayer to inherit because the record, which indicated the slayer was trying to
free herself from the victim, "fail [ed) to establish that the Lslayer) willfully,
unlawfully, and intentionally killed" her victim); Beene v. Gibralter Indus.
Life Ins. Co., 63 N.E.2d 299, 300 (Ind. 1945) (finding that even though the
slayer had been criminally convicted of manslaughter, there was a "total
absence of evidence that the killing was intentional"); Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1966) (finding
no evidence in the policy of law that a slayer rule applies to unintentional
homicide); Jackson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 254 A.2d 141, 147 (NJ.
1969) (explaining the "true test is whether the beneficiary intentionally
took the life of the insured")).
Schifanelli, 271 Md. at 188, 315 A.2d at 519.
Id. at 188-89, 315 A.2d at 519 (citing Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n,
406 S.W.2d at 149; Jackson, 254 A.2d at 147).
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98, 108 and accompanying text.
307 Md. 105, lO7-O8, 512 A.2d 389,390 (1986).
Id. at 113, 512 A.2d at 393.
Id. at 107, 113, 512 A.2d at 390, 393.
Id. at 111-12, 512 A.2d at 392-93. The statute laid out by the court states:
1) A person who kills another
a) may not share in the distribution of the decedent's estate as
an heir by way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee or legatee under the decedent's will, nor may he collect the
proceeds as a beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the decedent's life when the homicide is felonious and intentional;
b) may share in the distribution of the decedent's estate as an
heir by way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee
or legatee under the decedent's will and may collect the proceeds
as a beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the decedent's life
when the homicide is unintentional even though it is the result of
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in the victim's estate because the slayer "felonious[ly] and intentional [ly]" killed the victim.ll5 The court, however, also had to address the effect of the slayer's insanity on her right to inherit. ll6 To
determine the slayer'S rights with respect to her inheritance in the
absence of a comprehensive slayer statute, the court referred to the
statutory definition of criminal responsibilityY7 Allowing the slayer
to inherit, the court articulated its rationale:
The trier of fact must determine whether, at the time the
claimant killed the decedent, he lacked substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality of that conduct, or to conform
that conduct to the requirements of law, because of a mental
disorder or mental retardation. If the claimant were in that
such gross negligence as would render the killer criminally guilty of
involuntary manslaughter.
2) These principles apply not only to the killer but those claiming
through or under him.
3) The disposition of a criminal cause is not conclusive of the character of the homicide or of the criminal agency of the putative
killer in a civil proceeding concerning entitlement to assets of the
decedent.
a) It is not dispositive that no criminal prosecution was
brought against the alleged killer, or that charges against him were
dismissed on constitutional, statutory or procedural grounds or
otherwise, or that, upon a criminal trial he was found not guilty for
whatever reason, or was convicted of murder in the first or second
degree or of manslaughter.
b) In the determination of who is entitled to the assets of the
decedent, whether the alleged killer was the criminal agent and
whether the homicide was intentional and felonious or unintentional is a function within the ambit of the civil proceeding. In
short, the lack of or result of a criminal proceeding is not res judicata in a subsequent civil action.
Id.
115. Id. at 112-13, 512 A.2d at 392-93.
116. Id. at 113, 512 A.2d at 393. The Court of Appeals found Pearl was guilty of
murdering her mother, but was found insane. Id. at 120 & n.10, 512 A.2d at
397 & n.10. See generally Pouncey v. State, 297 Md. 264, 265, 465 A.2d 475,

476 (1983) (holding that a criminal "defendant can be both guilty of a
crime and [legally] insane at the time of its commission"). The ruling in
Pouncey differed from the ruling of the circuit court in Fard, the latter of
which determined Pearl committed no crime because she was insane at the
time of the matricide. Ford, 307 Md. at 119-20,512 A.2d at 396-97.
117. Fard, 307 Md. at 114, 12~125, 512 A.2d at 39~94, 398-99 (citing MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 12-108(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985) (current version at
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-109 (LexisNexis 2001». Section ~109
states:
(a) A defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct
if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental
disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity to:
(1) appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or
(2) conform that conduct to the requirements of law.
(b) For purposes of this section, "mental disorder" does not include an abnormality that is manifested only by repeated criminal
or otherwise antisocial conduct.
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category, he would not be criminally responsible for the killing ... [and] the slayer's rule is simply not applicable [.] 118
Thus, the Ford court added another prong to the common law slayer
rule in Maryland: a slayer who is not criminally responsible for his
homicide is not disqualified from inheriting from his victim. 11 9

4.

Diep v. Rivas

In 2000, the Court of Appeals was faced with another murder-suicide. This case, however, involved the distribution of the proceeds of
the slayer's life insurance policy.120 In Diep v. Rivas, Xuang Ky Tran
murdered his wife, Maria Rivas, and then committed suicide. 121 Mr.
Tran held a group accidental death and dismemberment benefit policy under which he was the "Insured," and Ms. Rivas was an "Insured
Person."122 The policy contained a successive preference beneficiary
provision that dictated the order of classes of persons to be paid if
there was no designated beneficiary.123 If any of the insured family
members predeceased the insured, the insured received payment, if
living, and the successive preference beneficiaries received payment if
the insured was not living.124 Mr. Tran's siblings argued they were
entitled to the proceeds as the successive preference beneficiaries of
the policy.125 In contrast, Dr. Hector Rivas, survivor of Mrs. Rivas, asserted that the successive preference beneficiaries of the policy were
Mrs. Rivas' heirs.126 Dr. Rivas further argued that even if Mr. Tran's
siblings were the rightful beneficiaries, they were disqualified by the
slayer rule. 127
The Court of Appeals determined that under the plain meaning of
the policy language Mr. Tran's siblings were the successive preference
beneficiaries,128 thereby rejecting Dr. Rivas' argument that they were
precluded by the slayer rule. 129 The court also pointed out that a majority of jurisdictions, including Maryland, have allowed "innocent
contingent beneficiaries" to collect under a life insurance policy when
the primary beneficiary has been "disqualified under the slayer
118.
119.
120.
12l.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Ford, 307 Md. at 122, 512 A.2d at 398.
Id. at 123, 512 A.2d at 398.
Diep v. Rivas, 357 Md. 668, 745 A.2d 1098 (2000).
Id. at 670, 745 A.2d at 1099.
Id. at 670, 672, 745 A.2d at 1099, 1100. The master policy defined "Insured
Person" to mean the insured, in this case Mr. Tran, and insured family
members of the insured.
Id. at 670-71, 745 A.2d at 1099. The successive preference beneficiaries of
the policy were ordered as follows: spouse, children, including legally
adopted children, parents, brothers and sisters, estate. Id.
Id. at 671, 745 A.2d at 1099.
Id.
Id. at 670-71, 745 A.2d at 1099.
Id. at 671, 745 A.2d at 1099.
Id. at 673, 745 A.2d at 110l.
Id. at 675-80, 684, 745 A.2d at 1101-04, 1106.
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rule."130 This precedent is traceable to the English case of Cleaver v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, in which Lord Justice Fry opined
that public policy should exclude the criminal, and all persons claiming under the criminal, from benefiting, but should "not ... exclude
alternative or independent rights."131 In conjunction with this rule,
Judge Rodowsky maintained that "to visit the consequences of Tran's
crime on his brother and sister conjures up the ghosts of corruption
of blood which is prohibited by Article 27 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights."132
Thus, Diep v. Rivas added yet another facet to the common law
slayer rule in Maryland-contingent beneficiaries of the slayer may
collect insurance proceeds in a murder-suicide situation, regardless of
whether they were selected by the slayer or predetermined by the policy.133 Though the fact pattern in Price v. Hitaffer 34 and Diep are very
similar, the Court of Appeals in Diep distinguished its ruling from Price
because the insurance policy, not a state statute, dictated the descent
and distribution of the insurance proceeds. 135 Mr. Tran's siblings
were alternate and independent beneficiaries under the scheme of
the insurance policy, whereas the heirs of Mr. Martin, in Price, were
not. 136 Synthesizing the holdings in Price and Diep, it appears that the
slayer rule in murder-suicide cases allows completely independent
heirs, due to their contingency status in an insurance policy, to take
through the slayer, while heirs claiming through the state intestacy
statute may not. 137 Significantly, the Court of Appeals'S 2004 decision
in Cook v. Grierson 138 obfuscated the slayer rule in Maryland. 139
130. [d. at 680,745 A.2d at 1104 (citing Life Ins. Co. v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410,
413-14 (E.D. Va. 1962»; Spencer v. Floyd, 785 S.W.2d 60, 64 (Ark. Ct. App.
1990); Beck v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 241 P.2d 544, 546 (Cal. 1952); Seidlitz
v. Eames, 753 P.2d 775, 777 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Carter v. Carter, 88 So.
2d 153, 160 (Fla. 1956); Brown v. Life Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wenckus, 244 A.2d 424, 426 (Me.
1968); Lamb v. Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 56 Md. App. 125, 133-34,467 A.2d
182, 187 (1983); Lee v. Aylward, 790 S.W.2d 462,463 (Mo. 1990); Gardner
v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 206 S.E.2d 818, 821 (N.C. App. 1974); Nat'l
Home Life Assurance Co. v. Patterson, 746 P.2d 696, 698 (Okla. Ct. App.
1987); Brooks v. Thompson, 521 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tenn. 1975».
131. 1 Q.B. 147, 159, 1891 WL 8835 (1892), cited with approval in Diep, 357 Md. at
682-83, 745 A.2d at 1105-06.
132. [d. at 677, 745 A.2d at 1103.
133. [d. at 682, 745 A.2d at 1105.
134. 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933).
135. Diep, 357 Md. at 675, 682, 745 A.2d at 1101-02, 1105.
136. See id. at 680, 745 A.2d at 1104; Price, 164 Md. at 512, 165 A. at 473.
137. Compare Diep, 357 Md. at 684, 745 A.2d at 1106, with Price, 164 Md. at 506,
518, 165 A. at 470, 475.
138. 380 Md. 502, 845 A.2d 1231 (2004).
139. See id. at 505, 509-10, 514, 845 A.2d at 1232, 1235, 1238; infra notes 132-33
and accompanying text.
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RECENT TREATMENT OF SLAYER RULE CASES IN MARYLAND: COOKv. GRlliRSON

The Court of Appeals of Maryland took a bold step when it expanded the reach of the slayer rule in Cook v. Grierson. I40 Significantly,
the Cook court ruled that a slayer's innocent children could not inherit from the slayer's victim because they were lineal descendents of
a living lineal descendent of the victim.141 Thus, the children were
not issue of their grandfather and could not inherit under Maryland's
statute of descent and distribution. I42
In Cook, the victim's widow, Deborah Grierson, asserted that Maryland's common law slayer rule, which disqualifies a murderer and anyone claiming through the murderer from taking from the victim's
estate, precluded Charles, her husband's son and slayer, from taking
his intestate share. I43 Subsequently, the victim's grandchildren, the
slayer's children, petitioned the orphans' court to inherit their grandfather's estate, and the court denied their request. 144 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland affirmed, holding that based on Maryland's intestate succession statute, Charles's children could not inherit from
their grandfather'S estate because their father was living issue of their
grandfather. 145 Although Charles was precluded from inheriting pursuant to Maryland's slayer rule, the court treated him as living issue
with the capacity to inherit. 146 Thus, in the absence of a slayer statute,
and under the law of intestate succession, the Court of Appeals precludedinnocent lineal descendents from inheriting from the slayer's
victim. 147
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals of Maryland examined Carter v.
Hutchison,148 a case from the Tennessee Court of Appeals. 149 In Carter,
the Tennessee court analyzed Tennessee's slayer statute as a two step
process: first, the slayer is disqualified from inheriting from his victim;
and second, the victim's estate should be distributed according to
Tennessee's intestacy statute. 150 According to the court, under the
Tennessee intestacy statute and subsequent interpretive case law, the
140. [d. at 513-14,845 A.2d at 1237-38.
14l. Id. at 505,845 A.2d at 1232 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 510, 845 A.2d at 1235. According to the statute, "issue means every
living lineal descendant except a lineal descendent of a living lineal descendant." MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-209 (LexisNexis 2001).
143. 380 Md. at 502,504,845 A.2d at 1232.
144. [d. at 504-05, 845 A.2d at 1232.
145. [d. at 505,845 A.2d at 1232. Prior to the Court of Appeals hearing the case,
the Orphan's Court decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Anne
Arundel County. Id.
146. Id. at 510, 845 A.2d at 1235.
147. [d. at 514, 845 A.2d at 1238.
148. 707 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
149. Cook v Grierson, 380 Md. 502, 512-513, 845 A.2d 1231, 1236-37 (2004) (citing Carter, 707 S.w.2d at 538).
150. Carter, 707 S.w.2d at 538 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-106 (2004)).

288

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 35

great-grandchildren, who were claiming through their slayer father,
were allowed to inherit from their murdered great-grandparents because they were issue under the statutory definition. 151 The court,
however, did not treat the slayer as predeceased, because the slayer
statute did not require such a determination. 152 Essentially, once the
slayer was disqualified and his inheritance lapsed, this triggered Tennessee's antilapse statute. 153 Therefore, the court did not have to declare the slayer as predeceased or as having disclaimed his
inheritance. 154
In Cook, the court's approach to its slayer rule was modeled after
Carter, however, the court neglected to emphasize in Cook the fact that
the Tennessee slayer statute identified the state's intestate succession
statutes as the rules governing the descent and distribution of the
slayer's rights. 155 In Carter, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee interpreted the state's slayer statute and intestate succession statutes to determine that the slayer's children could inherit from their murdered
grandparent's estate. 156 In Cook, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
151. [d. at 538-39 (defining the "issue of the decedent" as "unless otherwise limited, all the direct, lineal descendents of the deceased" (citing Burdick v.
Gilpin, 325 S.w.2d 547, 554 (1959»; Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Noel,
192 S.w.2d 825, 828 (1946); White v. Kane, 159 S.w.2d 92, 94-95 (1942».
The relevant portion of the Tennessee intestacy statute is found at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 31-2-104 (2004).
152. Carter, 707 S.W.2d at 539 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-106).
153. [d. at 538-39 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-104(b)(1».
154. [d. at 539.
155. Cook v Grierson, 380 Md. 502, 502, 512, 514, 845 A.2d 1231, 1231, 1236,
1238 (2004) (citing Carter, 707 S.W.2d 533). The Tennessee slayer statute
provides:
Any person who shall kill, or conspire with another to kill, or
procure to be killed, any other person from which the first named
person would inherit the property, either real or personal, or any
part thereof, belonging to such deceased person at the time of deceased person's death, or who would take the property, or any part
thereof, by will, deed, or otherwise, at the death of the deceased,
shall forfeit all right therein, and the same shall go as it would have
gone under the provisions of § 31-2-104, or by will, deed or other
conveyance, as the case may be, provided, that this section shall not
apply to any such killing as may be done by accident or in selfdefense.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-106 (2004).
Additionally, the Tennessee intestate succession statute, in pertinent
part, provides:
(b) The part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving
spouse under subsection (a) or the entire intestate estate if there is
no surviving spouse, passes as follows:
(1) To the issue of the decedent; if they are all of the same
degree of kinship to the decedent they take equally, but if of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree take by
representation.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-104 (2004).
156. Carter, 707 S.W.2d at 539.
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acted without the direction of the legislature, applying the Maryland
intestate succession statute. 157 A number of courts originally precluded a slayer from inheriting under intestate succession statutes,158
but an overwhelming majority of states have enacted slayer statutes
that treat the slayer as having predeceased, disclaimed his inheritance,
or died with the victim simultaneously.159 Although Maryland has not
chosen any of these approaches, it has yet to create a similarly logical
approach. 160 The Cook court dismissed the grandchildren's argument
for the adoption of the legal fiction that the slayer predeceased the
victim, and thus treated the victim's slayer as living. 161 Although this
result is congruent with Maryland's intestate succession statute, the
157. 380 Md. at 513-14, 845 A.2d at 1237-38.
158. See Weaver v. Hollis, 22 So. 2d 525, 529 (Ala. 1945) (construing the intestate statute according to the intent of the legislature to preclude a slayer);
Wright v. Wright, 449 S.W.2d 952,953-54 (Ark. 1970) (upholding a previous finding that the slayer statute was not limited to dower and curtsey);
Dutil! v. Dana, 113 A.2d 499, 501-02 (Me. 1952) (slayer's inheritance is
treated as a constructive trust); Budwit v. Herr, 63 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Mich.
1954) (recognizing that the principles set forth in Slocum v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 816, 818 (1923), preclude a slayer from taking under an
insurance policy and from taking under the statutes of descent and distribution); Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 644-45 (Mo. 1908) (holding
that the "common law doctrine of succession" does not apply to a slayer or
to any person claiming property "through or under the slayer"); Sikora v.
Sikora, 499 P.2d 808, 811 (Mont. 1972) (imposing a constructive trust on
the inheritance a slayer would have received by intestate succession); Kelley
v. State, 196 A.2d 68,70 (N.H. 1963) (dictum) (recognizing the imposition
of a constructive trust when a slayer has been unjustly enriched by his criminal act); In re Estate of Kalfus, 195 A.2d 903, 906 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1963) (stating "[e]ven in the absence of a specific statute, it has been held
that a murderer cannot inherit from his victim under the statute of descent
and distribution"); Ovalle v. Ovalle, 604 S.W.2d 526, 528-29 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980) (finding that a wife that used unjustified deadly force against her
husband should not be awarded life insurance benefits); In re Estate of Mahoney, 220 A.2d 475, 478 (Vt. 1966) (citing Kelley, 196 A.2d at 69-70) (common law maxims dictate a constructive trust should be imposed). See also,
e.g., Slocum, 139 N.E. 816, 816, 818 (Mass. 1923) (finding that a slayer would
be denied life insurance proceeds on his wife's life, and that the indicated
proceeds remaining after wife's estate claims were satisfied, would not go to
the slayer); DeZotell v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 245 N.W. 58,64-65 (S.D. 1932)
(holding that a slayer is barred from taking property from the deceased by
descent or succession); johnston v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 100 S.E. 865, 86667 (W. Va. 1919) (holding that a personal representative of the victim of a
murder may initiate a suit in order to recover the amount of the policy for
the benefit of the estate, as long as he or she is not the murderer); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 187(2) (1937) ("Where a person is murdered by his heir or next of kin, and dies intestate, the heir or next of kin
holds the property thus acquired ... upon a constructive trust for the person or persons who would have been heirs or next of kin if he had predeceased the estate.").
159. See supra note 9.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 67-142.
161. 380 Md. at 510, 513, 845 A.2d at 1236, 1237.
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court failed to address what the slayer's actual role is in the statutory
scheme of descent and distribution. 162
Under Maryland law, the slayer is not treated as predeceasing the
victim, disclaiming his inheritance, or dying simultaneously with the
victim. Absent a specific declaration as to the status of the slayer,163
the unanswered question is what role does a slayer have under Maryland law. In Cook, the slayer is alive; however, if the slayer kills himself,
the slayer's children become issue under the intestacy statute. 164 If
such a situation were to come before the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the court would once again have to add another facet to the
common law slayer rule. To eliminate this uncertainty and establish
uniformity, the slayer rule in Maryland must be codified.

v.

STATE STATUTES

It is the duty of a legislature to provide a uniform body of laws so
that not only state courts, but a state's citizens, are aware of the laws
and can reasonably comprehend and interpret them. 165 When a legislature remains inactive on an issue for too long, the judiciary may be
compelled to develop law on that particular issue. 166 Specifically, the
Maryland General Assembly has not enacted a slayer statute, which
has caused conflicting and unpredictable analyses of the common law
slayer rule. 167 Moreover, these analyses have frequently left unanswered questions that courts are likely to encounter in the future. 168

A.

Why a Statute?

Under the separation of powers doctrine, each branch of the government has its own duties and responsibilities dictated under the
U.S. Constitution. 169 The legislature promulgates the laws,170 the executive branch executes these laws,l71 and the judiciary interprets
them. 172 The judiciary is traditionally deferential to the legislature,
but judicial interpretation of a statutory scheme can sometimes result
in inconsistent and questioned outcomes. 173 The problem is further
162.
163.
164.
165.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. at 513, 845 A.2d at 1237.
See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-204 (Lexis Nexis 2001).
See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish?
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose
a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757, 779-80 (1995) (stating that "[i]fthe
law is in a constant state of flux, it cannot induce people to behave in ways
deemed beneficial to society").
See generally id. at 768-70.
See supra text accompanying notes 67-142.
See Olenn, supra note 16, at 1342.
See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
U.S. CONST. art. I.
U.S. CONST. art. II.
U.S. CONST. art. III.
See Fellows, supra note 27, at 546-47.
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exacerbated when there is no specific legislation for the judiciary to
interpret. 174 In such a circumstance, courts may be forced to playa
quasi-legislative role, creating a body of law through their decisions. 1 75
When the legislative branch of government chooses not to act on an
issue, it essentially acquiesces its lawmaking power to the judicial
branch, if and when that issue comes before the courts. 176 On the
one hand, this acquiescence is necessary to our system of lawmaking
because our legislatures would be substantially burdened if they had
to consider all ambiguities in the common law. 177 Indeed, the judicial
branch does not overstep its boundaries when rendering such decisions, but there comes a time when the legislature should take affirmative steps in order to create a uniform system of laws.

B.

"Why a Statute in Maryland?

The issue of whether and under what circumstances slayers should
be allowed to inherit from their victims is precisely the type of issue
that should be addressed by the legislature rather than the courts.
Unlike forty-two other states in this country, Maryland has not codified the common law slayer rule. 178 Consequently, over the past seventy-two years, Maryland courts have interpreted the common law
slayer rule in light of the common law maxims of equity in an attempt
to form a steadfast rule. 179 A steadfast rule, however, has not been the
result of the courts' common law interpretations. 18o Rather, Maryland
courts have developed an inconsistent and arguably incoherent body
of law. 18l Despite the inconsistencies and confusion created by the
common law development of the slayer rule since Price, the Maryland
legislature has remained inactive, giving the courts carte blanche to
develop this area of law. 182
174. See Fellows, supra note 27, at 547.
175. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrahly lc-rroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1, 22 (2001) (noting that early commentators of American law believed "common-law decision making amounted to Judicial legislation''');
see, e.g., Cook v. Grierson, 380 Md. 502, 512-13, 845 A.2d 1231, 1237 (2004)
(interpreting Maryland's intestate succession statute to preclude the slayer
and his heirs from inheriting from the slayer's victim); Perry v. Strawbridge,
108 S.W. 641, 644-45 (Mo. 1908) (construing the Missouri statute of descents and distributions to preclude any heir that "willfully takes the life of
his ancestor"); Ovalle v. Ovalle, 604 S.W.2d 526, 528 (1980) (citing In re
Estate of Laspy, 409 S.w.2d 725, 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (stating that a
widow can only be classified as such if she has become a widow "by the
ordinary and usual vicissitudes of life and not by her own felonious act"».
176. See G. Edward White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 781, 791-92 (2000).
177. See Fellows, supra note 27, at 547.
178. See statutes cited supra note 9.
179. See supra Part III.A.
180. See supra Parts III-IV.
181. See supra Part III.
182. See supra Parts III-IV.
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Although Maryland courts have spent over seventy years formulating and re-formulating the common law slayer statute,I83 their work is
far from finished. In Cook, the Court of Appeals of Maryland summarized the current state of the slayer rule in Maryland,I84 but this summary is not enough to properly guide future courts. Other factual
scenarios have yet to reach the courts, and Maryland courts will frequently have to deal with inconsistent case law to resolve these
cases. I85 For instance, murder-suicide in slayer cases presents an interesting fact pattern for courts to resolve. I86 In such cases, the slayer has
not physically predeceased his victim or disclaimed his inheritance
before ending his life, typically moments after killing his victim. I87 If
the slayer had committed suicide just after killing his father or
mother, his children would no longer be lineal descendants of a living
lineal descendant of the decedent; therefore, they would be able to
take under the laws of intestacy. 188 It logically follows that under this
murder-suicide scenario, Maryland courts would have no choice but
to allow the children to inherit. I89 The possibility of various types of
slayer scenarios begs the Maryland General Assembly to enact a statute
to guide the courts. I90
VI.

PROPOSED STATUTE FOR MARYLAND

Further judicial interpretation of Maryland's common law and current statutory scheme will not clarify or make uniform the slayer rule
183. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
184. 380 Md. at 508-09, 845 A.2d at 1235.
[A] person who intentionally and feloniously kills another may
not share in the distribution of the decedent's estate as an heir by
way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee or legatee under the decedent's will, nor may the slayer collect proceeds
as a beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the decedent's life.
These principles also apply to anyone claiming through or under
the slayer.
Id.
185. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
186. Olenn, supra note 16, at 1342 ("[B]ecause the innocent distributes of the
slayer may generally make a derivative claim to the slayer's property
through the victim's estate, now as rightful beneficiaries of the victim in
place of the deceased slayer.").
187. See, e.g., Pannone v. McLaughlin, 37 Md. App. 395, 377 A.2d 597 (1977).
188. See generally MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 1-209 to -210, 3-101, 3-103
(LexisNexis 2001).
189. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. The result in an intestate murder-suicide situation may be unclear, but in Pannone the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland determined how property should be transferred in a
murder-suicide if the property is held as tenants by the entirety. 37 Md.
App. 395, 377 A.2d 597. The Pannone court ruled that George Cousins severed his interest as a tenant by the entirety when he killed his wife, Kathleen Cousins. Id. at 407, 377 A.2d at 604. Therefore, his murderous act
rendered his survivorship interest "inoperative." Id.
190. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.

2005]

Ineffectiveness of the Common Law Slayer Rule

293

in Maryland. The courts' analyses of the current descent and distribution statutes have proven to be ineffective and overly burdensome for
the courts. 191 A comprehensive slayer statute will remedy the lack of
uniformity in slayer rule interpretation and provide courts with a concrete guideline. 192
A.

Inadequate Alternatives to Enacting a Slayer Statute
Two seemingly viable solutions to avoid the harsh result in Cook are

(1) redefining the statutory definition of "issue" to include living descendants of a living lineal descendant who is a slayer;193 and (2) ad-

ding a provision to the antilapse statute that would allow a slayer's
inheritance to lapse to his blood relatives. 194 While these solutions
may provide guidance to courts, they do not completely resolve the
problems associated with not having a slayer statute. Indeed, redefining "issue" and changing the antilapse statute may provide temporary
results, but a permanent solution should be in place to deal with new
slayer-victim-heirs scenarios in the future.
1.

Redefining "Issue"

In Cook, the Court of Appeals asserted that if the General Assembly
is dissatisfied with its decision, it should change the statutes of descent
and distribution. 195 The court essentially suggested that the General
Assembly change the statutory definition of "issue" so that it would not
exclude lineal descendants of living lineal descendants;196 however,
this statutory change must be strictly qualified to apply only to slayer
cases. If it is not clearly qualified, any and all living issue at the time of
the intestate's death, including a death by natural causes, would be
able to take. 197 This situation directly defeats the legislative intent of
preserving the most natural form of descent and distribution, that of
parents inheriting before their children. 198 Redefining "issue" in Ma191. See generally discussion supra Parts III-IV; Julie Waller Hampton, The Need jor
a New Slayer Statute in North Carolina, 24 CAMPBELL L. REv. 295, 315 (2002)
(discussing adoption of a comprehensive slayer statute as a means to "relieve the pressure on the courts").
192. See also Hampton, supra note 191, at 315 (discussing the Uniform Probate
Code provision as a comprehensive slayer statute that would guide courts
and promote uniformity).
193. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-209 (2001).
194. See id. § 4-403.
195. 380 Md. at 514,845 A.2d at 1238.
196. See id. at 512-14, 845 A.2d at 1237-38 (citing Carter v. Hutchinson, 707
S.W.2d 533, 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) (citing TENN. CODE ANN., §§ 31-1106,31-2-104 (2001 & Supp. 2004))).
197. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 1-209, 3-103. For example, if the
statute was not qualified, then the child and the grandchild of the intestate
decedent would both partiCipate in the distribution of the decedent's
estate.
198. See generally Barron v. Janney, 225 Md. 228, 170 A.2d 176 (1961).
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ryland would create unnecessary confusion and unpredictable results. 199 Therefore, the General Assembly should not change the
statutory definition of "issue" as the Cook court suggests,200 but rather
should enact a slayer statute that would complement existing legislation and supplement case law.

2.

Changing the Antilapse Statute

Additionally, Maryland's antilapse statute is inadequate to properly
guide courts in slayer cases. Technically, if the slayer's victim has a
valid will, the slayer's inheritance will lapse and become part of the
victim's residuary estate. 201 But an antilapse statute prevents triggering the lapse into the residuary estate and allows a "void or inoperative" bequest to go to the legatee, or legatees, who would have taken if
the slayer had not existed. 202
Maryland's antilapse statute falls within the minority of jurisdictions
that do not require the legatee to be related to the testator for the gift
to pass to the legatee's estate. 203 Thus, a devise to a non-blood relative
will pass through that person's estate in favor of blood relatives of the
testator. 204 Enacting an additional section to the antilapse statute
treating the slayer's bequest as lapsing seems, at first glance, to resolve
the problem of not allowing innocent issue to inherit while preserving
the intent of the testator, but what if the slayer is not a blood relative
of his victim? If the bequest to the non-blood relative slayer was
treated as lapsing, then the slayer's children, who were in no way related to the testator, albeit innocent, would inherit.205 This patently
runs against the intent to pattern statutory descent and distribution
after a testator's wishes. 206 To allow the non-blood relative slayer to
control his victim's estate in such a way violates common law maxims
of equity.207 In other words, while the slayer cannot take from the
199. Compare Cook, 380 Md. 502, 845 A.2d 1231 (suggesting that "issue" should
include lineal descendants of living lineal descendants, which could lead to
parents and children inheriting contemporaneously), with Barron, 225 Md.
228, 170 A.2d 176 (emphasizing the importance of parents inheriting
before their children).
200. 380 Md. at 514, 845 A.2d at 1238.
201. See, e.g., Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 325 S.E.2d 195, 197 (N.C. 1985)
(slayer's share is void and is divided among residuary beneficiaries).
202. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 4-403 to -404 (LexisNexis2001).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. § 4-403(b).
206. See Barron v. Janney, 225 Md. at 234-35, 170 A.2d at 180 (1961) ("[T]he
purpose of the statutes of descent and distribution is to make such a will for
an intestate as he would have been most likely to make for himself .... ").
207. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.

2005]

Ineffectiveness of the Common Law Slayer Rule

295

estate after killing the victim, he continues to dictate how the estate
will be distributed. 208
A viable solution to this would be to add a provision to the antilapse
statute that prevents it from being triggered when the slayer is a nonblood relative. 209 This achieves the common law purpose of lapse;210
however, it makes the presumption that a testator favors blood relatives over non-relatives. 211 While this presumption may seem harsh in
instances where a testator is particularly close with his non-relatives, it
would more likely further the average testator's intent. 212
Although redefining the statutory definition of "issue" and changing the antilapse statute may help Maryland courts to frame the common law slayer rule, a clear and concise slayer statute would be more
effective. 213 The key to the slayer rule is that the killing must have
obstructed the testator's power to distribute his or her estate; therefore, a slayer statute must neutralize the effect of the killing. 214
B.

Proposed Slayer Statute for Maryland

The following is a proposed slayer statute for Maryland that will
eliminate the ambiguities currently existing in Maryland case law.
Effect of Felonious and Intentional Killing on Descent and Distribution of Victim's Estate.
(A) A slayer who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent
shall be treated as disclaiming all benefits with respect to the
decedent's estate. These benefits include: the slayer'S intestate
share under § 3-102 and § 3-103, bequest under the decedent's
208. Fellows, supra note 27, at 530 n.112 (discussing MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 4-403(b) (Supp.2004)).
209. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
210. A devise in a will lapses when the beneficiary of the devise dies after the
execution but before the administration of a testator's will. See Gallaudet
Univ. v. Nat'l Soc'y of the Daughters of the Am. Rev., 117 Md. App. 171,
187, 699 A.2d 531, 538 (1997) (citing Bartlett v. Ligon, 135 Md. 620, 623,
109 A.2d 473, 475 (1920)). This common law rule presumes that the testator would not want the devise to go to anyone but tl1e specific beneficiary.
See generally Livingston v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 157 Md. 492, 502, 146 A.
432,471 (1929) (quoting 2JOHN E. ALEXANDER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF WILLS § 771 (Bender-Moss Co. 1918)). Legislation has abandoned this
presumption in favor of avoiding intestacy. Galludet Univ., 117 Md. App. At
187, 699 A.2d at 538. Specifically, antilapse statutes substitute tl1e heirs of
the beneficiary in place of the beneficiary himself to avoid intestacy. [d. at
187-88, 699 A.2d at 538-39.
211. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hendrie, 92 N.W.2d 282,387-88 (1958) (remanding case
for further trial court fact-finding after determining that there was insufficient evidence indicating tl1at the victim would have wanted her slayer-husband's children by a prior marriage to inherit over her designated
beneficiaries) .
212. See Barron, 225 Md. at 235, 170 A.2d at 180 (citing W.W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw RELATIVE TO GIITS AND ADVANCEMENTS § 524 (1893)).
213. See Hampton, supra note 191.
214. Sherman, supra note 31, at 861.
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will, elective share, pretermitted heir share, family allowance,
beneficiary designations, and any other distributions under an
insurance policy or trust. The slayer severs his or her interest
in any property held as tenants by the entirety with the decedent, therefore transforming the property to tenants in common by virtue of his or her act.
(B) The felonious and intentional killing of the decedent revokes
any revocable (1) disposition or appointment of property made
by the decedent to the slayer in a governing instrument, (2)
provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or
nongeneral power of appointment on the slayer, and (3) nomination of the slayer in a governing instrument, nominating or
appointing the slayer to serve in any fiduciary or representative
capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee,
or agent.
(C) Subsection (A) will have no effect on the rights of lineal descendants of the slayer or lineal descendents of the slayer's victim. These lineal descendants are entitled only to the share
the slayer has forfeited.
(D) A wrongful acquisition of decedent's property by the slayer not
covered by subsections (A) and (B) shall be treated in accordance with the principal that a slayer cannot profit from his or
her own wrong.
(E) Definitions. For the purposes of this section:
(1) "Governing instrument" means any governing instrument executed by the decedent.
(2) "Revocable" with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision or nomination, means one under which the decedent, at the time
of, or immediately before death, was alone empowered, by law or
under the governing instrument, to cancel the designation in favor of
the slayer, whether or not the decedent was then empowered to designate himself in the place of his slayer and/or the decedent then had
capacity to exercise the power. 215
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Cook, based on the plain meaning of Maryland's intestacy statute,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland excluded the innocent children of a
slayer from inheriting from their grandfather. 216 Yet, it is not only this
harsh result of Cook that should spur the Maryland legislature to enact
a slayer statute, but also the realization that other situations will arise
that will further complicate and create inconsistencies in Maryland
215. See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-803(a)(2)-(3), (b), (c), (f) (amended
1993).
216. 380 Md. 502, 513, 845 A.2d 1231, 1237.
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case law. 217 For example, should the slayer rule be applied to mercy
killings or assisted suicides? And if so, how? The core of the slayer
rule is to disqualifY a slayer from inheriting from his crime, not to
disqualifY innocent family members who never intended to profit
from the killing. Maryland case law has defined a slayer as one who
"intentional [ly] and felonious [ly]" kills and is criminally responsible
for the death of a victim. 218 The Cook decision has extended this definition to the children of the slayer. 219 The Court of Appeals may have
had no choice but to exclude these children, but the General Assembly must take notice of this decision and adopt a slayer statute to promote fairness and uniformity in the courts.

Tara L. Pehusht

217. See discussion supra Part IV.
218. Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 111-12, 512 A2d 389, 392 (1986) (citing
Schifanelli v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177,315 A2d 513 (1974); Chase v. jenifer,
219 Md. 564, 150 A2d 251 (1959); and Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505,165
A 470 (1933».
219. 380 Md. at 513,845 A2d at 1237.
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